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Abstract: Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are mostly imple-
mented for three reasons: to circumvent budgetary constraints, en-
courage efficiency and improvement of quality in the provision of 
public infrastructure. One of the ways of reaching the latter objec-
tive is by the introduction of performance-based standards tied to 
bonuses and penalties to reward or punish the performance of the 
contractor. These performance based standards often refer to differ-
ent aspects such as technical, environmental and safety issues. 
This paper focuses on the implementation of safety based incen-
tives in PPPs. The main aim of this paper is to analyze whether the 
incentives to improve road safety in PPPs are effective in improv-
ing safety ratios in Spain. To this end, negative binomial regression 
models have been applied using information from the Spanish high 
capacity network in 2006. 
The findings indicate that even though road safety is highly influ-
enced by variables that are not much controllable by the contrac-
tor such as the Average Annual Daily Traffic and the percentage of 
heavy vehicles in the highway, the implementation of safety incen-
tives in PPPs has a positive influence in the reduction of fatalities, 
injuries and accidents. 
Keywords: Public Private Partnerships, performance-based quality 
standards, road safety. 
Resumen: Las asociaciones público-privadas (APP) se ejecutan so-
bre todo por tres razones: para eludir las restricciones presupuestar-
ias, fomentar la eficiencia y la mejora de la calidad en la provisión 
de infraestructura pública. Una de las maneras de alcanzar este úl-
timo objetivo es mediante la introducción de normas basadas en el 
rendimiento vinculados a las bonificaciones y penalizaciones para 
premiar o castigar el desempeño del contratista. Estos estándares 
basados en el desempeño a menudo se refieren a diferentes aspectos 
como los problemas técnicos, ambientales y de seguridad. 
Este documento se centra en la aplicación de incentivos basados 
en la seguridad de las APP. El objetivo principal de este trabajo es 
analizar si los incentivos para mejorar la seguridad vial en las APP 
son eficaces en la mejora de relaciones de seguridad en España. 
Para ello, los modelos de regresión binomial negativa se han aplica-
do con la información de la red española de alta capacidad en 2006. 
Los resultados indican que a pesar de que la seguridad vial está 
muy influenciada por variables que no son controlables tanto por el 
contratista como por el Tráfico medio diario anual y el porcentaje 
de vehículos pesados en la autopista, la aplicación de incentivos de 
seguridad en las APP tiene una influencia positiva en la reducción 
de las muertes, lesiones y accidentes. 
Palabras clave: Asociaciones público-privadas, normas de calidad 
basadas en el rendimiento, seguridad vial. 
1. Introduction 
Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are mostly implemented to cir-
cumvent budgetary constraints, and to encourage efficiency and 
quality in the provision of public infrastructure in order to reach 
social welfare. One of the ways of reaching the latter objective is 
by the introduction of performance based standards tied to bonuses 
and penalties to reward or punish the performance of the contractor. 
One of the most common ways of implementing PPPs in managing 
infrastructure is through the concession approach, which consists 
basically in transferring final design, construction, maintenance, 
and operation of the infrastructure to a private consortium, in ex-
change for which that consortium receives the right to charge a fee 
to the user orto the government on behalf of the user, for a period of 
time contractually agreed in advance (Vassallo and Gallego, 2005). 
One of the key aspects of PPPs is to encourage the private sector to 
manage and operate the infrastructure in the best way. To that end, 
in the last few years, PPPs are evolving from mere demand-based 
contracts (when the revenues of the contractor are related to the 
traffic demand) to performance-based contracts referred to different 
aspects such as availability, congestion, state of the pavement, safe-
ty, and so on. Consequently, the revenues of the contractor tend to 
depend more and more to the quality of the services rather than on 
traffic demand (Harding et al , 2010). 
Two reasons lie behind this trend. First, PPP contractors can mana-
ge better the service performance they offer than the traffic flows in 
the infrastructure. And second, by encouraging the PPP contractors 
to provide a better service, by aligning the social and the private 
benefits, they will end up producing a more efficient outcome for 
society. 
Traditionally, most of the infrastructure management contracts, 
including PPPs, had not introduced explicit incentives to improve 
quality. However, nowadays most PPP contracts are encouraging 
the introduction of incentives to foster the contractor to provide an 
optimal quality level. In this way, the contracts incorporate a set of 
standards that the contractor must fulfill. If the contractor fails to 
comply with these requirements, the public authority will penalize 
the contractor or even rescind the contract. 
This approach has moved many countries to introduce performan-
ce based indicators tied to bonuses and penalties in their PPP con-
tracts. Some countries such as United Kingdom, Finland, Portugal 
and Spain have introduced these kind of incentives. 
Those performance-based incentives, however, have to be introdu-
ced in the right way in PPP contracts. To that end, the marginal 
reward to the contractor for reaching a certain quality level should 
never be larger than the marginal social benefit produced at that 
level. The contractor will provide a quality level at the point whe-
re the marginal revenue obtained due to a certain quality increase 
equals its marginal cost. If the incentives are defined this way, the 
contractor will be encouraged to provide the best service compati-
ble with its production costs (Vassallo, 2007). 
The aim of this paper is to identify whether the incentives to impro-
ve road safety in PPPs are ultimately effective in improving safety 
ratios with an empirical analysis for the case of Spain. The results 
show that there are more fatalities, injuries and accidents on road 
segments without incentives when they are compared with other 
segments with incentives. 
The paper is divided in seven sections. After this introduction, we 
describe the experience in the introduction of safety incentives in 
highway PPPs across Europe. In the third section, we describe the 
characteristics of the highway network in Spain. In the fourth sec-
tion, we show a literature review of the models explaining the va-
riables influencing road safety ratios. In the fifth section, we explain 
the data sources used for the empirical analysis. In the sixth section, 
we develop the methodology and explain the results obtained. In the 
last section, we remark the main conclusions and further research. 
2. Analysis of experiences in the introduction of road 
safety incentives in Europe 
Europe is the world's region with the greater tradition of incorpo-
rating performance-based incentives in PPPs. There are few coun-
tries with PPP roads that introduce positive incentives based on ex-
plicit road safety indicators. These countries where this was done, 
it became a normal practice and the latest PPP contracts continue 
to introduce and improve these incentives. This happens in Spain, 
Finland, Hungary, Norway, Portugal and United Kingdom. Italy in-
troduced price-caps tied to road safety indicators in such a way that 
the concessionaire is allowed to set higher tolls if the safety ratios 
are better. In Ireland, PPP road contracts include some road safety 
indicators but they do not provide bonuses. In other countries, like 
Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium, there are new and sophisti-
cated PPP contracts, but they do not have positive incentives based 
on explicit road safety indicators. 
The design of the road safety indicators is quite heterogeneous 
across different countries. There are differences both in the variable 
adopted to measure the outcome and in the final formula employed. 
Most of the PPPs include number of injuries, number of fatalities or 
a combination of number of light accidents, serious accidents and 
fatal accidents to build the indicator. 
On the other hand, including the exposure to the risk (expressed by 
traffic) is a generalized practice. Very often, the initial accident data 
is divided by the annual traffic, usually measured in terms of mi-
llions or billions of vehicles-kilometers. E18 road (Muurla-Lohja) 
in Finland, the M6 road in Hungary, several PPPs in Portugal (the 
IP-4, for instance) and the latest PPP roads awarded in Spain use 
this methodology. The advantage of introducing the exposure to the 
risk (traffic) explicitly is that distortions in road safety results are 
reduced. 
With the same aim, in many other PPP contracts the assessment 
of the indicator is done by comparing similar roads, in terms of 
traffic, number of carriageways, etc. With this methodology it is 
possible to control the global evolution of casualties by many fac-
tors, most of them not manageable by the road operator. Some road 
contracts where the indicator is set in this way are E-18 road (Grim-
stad - Kristiansand) in Norway, the latest PPP roads awarded in the 
United Kingdom (for example, Al & M25) and some PPP roads in 
Spain (like the M-407 highway). 
Regarding the way of rewarding or penalizing the contractor, it 
was identified two trends: incentives related to the extension of the 
deadline of the project, and incentives related to increase the fee to 
be paid to the PPP contractor. 
3. Characteristics of highways in Spain 
Spain has extensive experience in managing and financing highways 
through public-private-partnerships (PPPs). Most of the PPPs have 
been put into effect through concession contracts that have a long 
tradition in Spanish administrative law. Most of the highway con-
cessions awarded in Spain have been toll highways. However, in the 
last few years, there was a large increase in the number of other PPP 
approaches, such as shadow-toll or performance-based contracts. 
Three different periods regarding the implementation of highway 
concessions in Spain can be identified: from 1967 to 1975, from 
1976 to 1995, and from 1996 to the present. Between 1967 and 
1975, 2,042 km of toll highways were granted by the central gover-
nment of Spain. The results of the implementation of concession 
contracts in Spain during this period were rather controversial. On 
the one hand, highway concessions achieved the goal of providing 
the country with a modern highway network at a time when the 
public budget of Spain was not sufficient to afford such a huge cost. 
On the other hand, the guarantees made by the government to fa-
cilitate concessions' funding over time became very costly for the 
country (Izquierdo and Vassallo, 2004). 
The second stage of highway concessions is from 1976 to 1995. 
In this period, no highway concessions were awarded. There were 
several reasons for this. First, the two petroleum crises in the 1970s 
destabilized the Spanish economy. Second, after Franco's death, 
the political atmosphere in Spain was uncertain. Third, and most 
important, the Socialist government, which took office in 1982 and 
remained until 1996, was politically opposed to promoting private 
concessions as a means to finance highways. Instead, the socialist 
government opted for modernizing the Spanish road network by 
widening and upgrading the most important roads, turning them 
into dual-roadway fast lanes. These free highways were called "au-
tovías". 
The term "autovías" was used in Spain in the early years of 80s 
for identifying any free highway with physically separated lanes in 
each direction. The first autovías in Spain were built by doubling 
lanes out of single carriageways. The design standards of these 
highways (known as first generation autovías) had design standards 
well below those of the toll highways. 
Since 2000, the quality standards in the construction of autovías 
improved notably to make comparable with toll highways. These 
are called second generation autovías. There is no technical diffe-
rence between second generation autovías and toll highways. The 
first generation autovías and second generation autovías were built, 
funded and managed by the Spanish government. None of the pu-
blic highways (autovías) has economic incentives to improve road 
safety though the government is committed to building and maintai-
ning the autovías with socially expected quality standards. 
The third stage began in 1996 and continues into the present. In 
1996, the conservative Popular Party took office in Spain. The need 
to contain Spain's public deficit was the most difficult challenge 
facing the new government. This was the main reason why the new 
government decided to implement once again the policy of offe-
ring concessions so as to encourage the participation of the private 
sector in financing new transportation infrastructure. From 1996 to 
now, 1,003 kilometers of new toll highway concessions have been 
awarded by the central government of Spain through this approach. 
Another novelty of the period since 1996 is that not only the Spa-
nish central government, but also the regional and even the local 
governments have started using the concession approach to imple-
ment both toll and shadow-toll highways. 
The Spanish high capacity network in 2006 is presented in Figure 1. 
Most of the PPPs implemented in the last stage include a provision 
to extend the contract duration up to four years if several perfor-
mance-based indicators tied to quality aspects like queuing in toll 
plazas, congestion, state of the pavement, safety, and satisfaction 
of the users are ultimately fulfilled. Other PPP's awarded recently 
in Spain also include incentives in terms of annual bonuses to be 
incorporated to the periodic fee paid by the government to the con-
tactor. 
Regarding safety, the PPP contractor can be granted an extension 
of the contract if safety indicators remain below an accident bench-
mark for similar roads. To that propose the government measures in 
a yearly basis the Risk Index (RI) and Mortality Index (MI) of the 
highways and compare it with other highways with similar charac-
teristics in terms of alignment and traffic flow. 
Figure 1.2006Spanish high capacity network. 
Source: Ministerio de Fomento (2007) 
4. Models that explain road safety: a literature review 
This paper analyzes whether the incentives to improve road safety 
in PPPs are effective. The statistical models most commonly used 
to explain the relationship between motor vehicle accidents and a 
set of predictor variables are the Poisson and NB regression models 
(Miaou and Lum, 1993; Noland and Oh, 2004; Chang, 2005; Ca-
liendo et al., 2007). 
From an empirical stand-point, the relationship between accident 
frequency and traffic flows can be found in Jovanis and Chang 
(1986), Abdel-Aty and Essam Radwan (2000) and Persaud et al. 
(2000); and the relationship between accident rate and traffic flow 
can be found in Vitaliano and Held (1991) and Hauer and Bamfo 
(1997). The relationship between accident frequency or accident 
rate and traffic flows show a great variation in theirs results. 
Jovanis and Chang (1986), Abdel-Aty and Essam Radwan (2000) 
and Persaud et al. (2000) point out that accident frequency increa-
ses with Average Annual Daily Traffic (AADT). On the other hand, 
Vitaliano and Held (1991) cannot detect any significant increase in 
the accident rate when AADT increases. According to Hauer and 
Bamfo (1997) the accident rate even decreases with an increasing 
AADT. 
Few studies have analyzed the effect of heterogeneous flows, and 
specifically the effect that the presence of heavy good vehicles 
(HGVs) in the traffic flow has on accidents. Hiselius (2004) analy-
zed the relationship between accident frequency and traffic flow in 
four different road types according to speed limit and road width 
in two conditions: homogenous and heterogeneous traffic. The re-
sults show that the expected number of accidents increases less than 
proportionally with the traffic flow, in the homogenous case. For 
the heterogeneous case, the expected number of accidents decrea-
ses with increasing number of trucks. According to Arenas et al. 
(2009), the expected number of accident increases with the addition 
of one vehicle in AADT, and increases with one additional HGV 
when comparing high capacity roads to single carriageway roads. 
Other studies have been carried out to establish relationships bet-
ween accidents and the frequency of intersections (Ivan and O'Mara, 
1997), environmental factor (Fridstrem et al , 1995; Shankar et al., 
1995; Chang, 2005; Caliendo et al , 2007), geometric infrastructure 
characteristics (Hauer, 2004; Chang, 2005), number of lanes (Mil-
ton and Mannering, 1998; Noland and Oh, 2004), and speed limits 
(Fridstrem et al., 1995; Ossiander and Cummings, 2002). In this 
paper, Poisson and negative binomial (NB) regression models were 
applied to know the relationship between safety incentives and road 
safety in Spain. This paper focuses on variables related to traffic 
flow, infrastructure characteristics (intersections), road operation 
and incentives given to the PPP contractors. The authors have not 
found any empirical study about safety incentives offered to the 
PPP contractors. 
5. Data for the case of Spain 
The models that were calibrated in this paper cover the year 2006. 
We chose this year because it is the most recent year where a com-
plete database is available. 
The data used for the empirical model came from two different sou-
rces: police-reported accident data supplied by the Ministry of Inter-
nal Affairs (Ministerio del Interior, 2006) and traffic data supplied 
by the Ministry of Public Works (Ministerio de Fomento, 2006). 
Using these databases it was necessary to build the final database 
combining both accident data and traffic data. The population for 
the models were made up of road stretches of the Spanish high-
capacity network both PPP highways (toll highways) and public 
highways {autovías). 
Some exogenous variables that may potentially influence safety and 
do not depend on the concessionaire's ability to manage the road 
were selected. These are: continuous variables such as (1) Avera-
ge annual daily traffic (AADT), (2) Percentage of heavy goods ve-
hicles (%HGV) and (3) Number of intersections for each stretch 
(INT) and two selected variables that may explain any relation bet-
ween PPPs and accidents, (4) Road operation (RO) and (5) Incenti-
ves (INC). Furthermore, in order to fit the model it was considered 
the vehicle exposure (vk). It was measured in millions of vehicle-
kilometers as vk = 365 1 AADT/106, where AADT and 1 are res-
j j j ' J J 
pectively the average annual daily traffic and length (km) of road 
section j obtained from traffic database. 
The number of intersections for each stretch (INT) introduced as 
discrete value with 2 levels (it takes 1 for stretches with at least 1 in-
tersection and it takes 0 otherwise) was obtained from the Geogra-
phic Information System (GIS), the analyses was performed using 
ArcGis 9.2. Each stretch of the sample was analyzed using the GIS 
application to count the number of intersections. 
Data for Road operation (RO), introduced in models as categorical 
variable, was obtained from the Traffic map 2006 (Ministry of Pu-
blic Works). The roadway segmentation is defined by the Ministry 
of Public Works (Ministerio de Fomento, 2006b), which can be for 
the case of the Spanish high capacity network: second generation 
autovías (AV), first generation autovías (1AV) or toll highways 
(TH). TH are PPPs, AV and 1AV are public highways. 
To know which segments had road safety incentives (INC) it was 
analyzed each concession contract in force in 2006. The first Spa-
nish concession contract awarded with implementation of road 
safety incentives was in 2002. All of the contracts from 2002 to 
2006 were analyzed. INC is a discrete variable with 2 levels (it 
takes 1 for stretches with safety incentives and it takes 0 otherwise). 
For this study, the dependent variables are the fatal, injury and ac-
cident rates. 1,042 road segments were extracted out of a total of 
6,293 from the 2006 traffic map, after selection criteria based on 
complete information for traffic flow and infrastructure variables. 
It was considered stretches with and without accidents to avoid se-
lection bias. The study includes PPPs (toll highways) and public 
highways (first and second generation autovías). For this study was 
considered only stretches of the Spanish Interurban Road State Net-
work. The final data base represents 62% of the total Spanish high-
capacity network. The total number of segments (with and without 
accidents) and the length by road operation are presented in Table 
1. The percentages in the table are by column. 
Road 
operation 
AV 
1AV 
with ac-
cidents 
275 
43 
Total 378 
N° 
Without 
accidents 
287 
266 
664 
Segments 
Total 
562 
309 
1,042 
With 
accidents 
26.39 
4.13 
36.28 
% 
Without 
accidents 
27.54 
25.53 
10.65 
63.72 
Total 
53.93 
29.66 
16.41 
100 
Length 
(km) 
3,790.46 
2,285.02 
1,372.24 
7,447.72 
Table 1: Road segment data. 
The descriptive statistics are represented in Table 2. The descriptive 
statistics indicate that the mean traffic intensity (AADT) is higher 
on 1AV than AV and TH. The low traffic intensity in TH could be 
explained because the users pay tolls. 
There is more heavy good vehicles traffic in public highways (AV 
and 1AV) than PPPs (TH). The range and the standard deviation in 
AV and 1 AV are higher than TH, which indicates more heterogenei-
ty in traffic flow. 
Variables 
AADT 
%HGV 
Road 
operation 
^ | 
1AV 
TH 
Total 
AV 
1AV 
TH 
Total 
AV 
1AV 
TH 
Total 
1AV 
TH 
Total 
Mean 
23,686.04 
35,735.05 
16,508.43 
26,080.92 
18.53 
23.37 
10.35 
18.63 
2.08 
2.38 
1.54 
2.08 
52.28 
79.25 
42.51 
58.68 
S.D. 
21,875.96 
34,262.09 
12,950.00 
26,046.31 
10.12 
8.95 
5.39 
10.08 
1.21 
1.59 
0.70 
1.29 
56.22 
70.65 
42.91 
60.60 
Range 
139,040.00 
186,365.00 
58,093.00 
190,406.00 
72.40 
48.10 
32.60 
73.70 
8.00 
12.00 
3.00 
12.00 
451.28 
355.89 
250.19 
451.28 
Minimum 
1,270.00 
5,135.00 
1,094.00 
1,094.00 
2.80 
4.60 
1.50 
1.50 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.42 
3.13 
0.48 
0.42 
Maximum 
140,310.00 
191,5000.00 
59,187.00 
191,500.00 
75.20 
52.70 
34.10 
75.20 
8.00 
12.00 
3.00 
12.00 
451.70 
359.02 
250.67 
451.70 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics by road operation and total. Year 2006. 
6. Methodology and results 
Poisson and NB regressions were applied to determine the relation-
ship between fatalities, injuries and accidents and traffic variables, 
number of intersections for each stretch, road operation and road 
safety incentives offered to the concessionaire. In this work the res-
ponse variables are number of fatalities, injuries and accidents. 
The Poisson overdispersion parameter indicates that the data may 
be overdispersed. When Pearson's chi-square divided by the de-
grees of freedom is greater than 1, the data may be overdispersed, 
otherwise the data may be underdispersed. All Poisson models pre-
sented Value/df greater than 1, therefore it was necessary to test 
the NB as an alternative model, which enables the variance of the 
dependent variable to differ from its mean. 
The accident rate of the j segment (k) is defined as the expected 
number of accidents (E[Y] ) per million-vehicle km. Therefore the 
regression model is then expressed as E[Y]=1 vk, using the log-link 
function to relate the response to the linear predictor. 
The general expression for the estimated model is: 
Eft,] = exp\T0 + 2_tPm Xmj + pv In vkj J 
V m=l I 
With the restriction /?v 
The accident rate is expressed as: 
A
" - ^ k ~ 
Table 3 summarizes the estimated NB regressions. Each column 
refers to a model with the endogenous variables and every row 
to exogenous variables. There is an estimated parameters for 
each variable. The significance of coefficients was checked using 
Wald statistic (in bracket), which rejects the null hypothesis that 
the coefficient is zero with a level of 95% confidence. Different 
goodness-of-fit statistics were used to select the model such as 
deviance, log-likelihood and Pearson chi-square statistics. Other 
measures were also evaluated such as Akaike Information Crite-
rion (AIC) (Akaike, 1974) and the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC) (Schwarz, 1978). 
A criterion for variables inclusion was used by testing the likeli-
hood ratio (LR). In addition, the correlation coefficient between 
them was prevented. 
After analyzing Tables 3, it could highlight the following results: 
1. Log(AADT) is statistically significant for the fatality, injury 
and accident rates. The coefficient signs are negative for all 
models (fatalities, injuries and accidents), suggesting that a 
greater AADT is associated with lower rates for fatalities, in-
juries and accidents. This result confirms the hypothesis pro-
posed by Vitaliano and Held (1991) and Hauer and Bamfo 
(1997) that accident rates decrease when AADT increases. 
2. Log(%HGV) was found to be statistically significant for in-
jury and accident models. The coefficient signs are negative 
for all models. This means that the larger the percentage of 
heavy good vehicles the smaller the injury and accident rates. 
This could be related to the speed reduction that heavy vehi-
cles impose to light vehicles on the traffic flow. This result is 
in line with Hiselius (2004), if this analysis was in terms of 
number of accidents. 
3. INC variable showed the expected negative sign, suggesting 
that establishing incentives in the PPP contracts is associa-
ted with lower rates for fatalities, injuries and accidents. The 
coefficient signs do not change in all models. This variable 
was found to be statistically significant for injury and accident 
models. 
4. The INT (intersection) variable showed the expected positive 
signs suggesting that the increased number of intersections is 
associated with the increased level of fatalities, injuries and 
accidents. There are more fatalities, injuries and accidents in 
stretches with at least one intersection than stretches without 
intersections. However, this variable was found to be statisti-
cally insignificant. 
The main reason for the insignificance of INT in the models 
could be that the kind of roads used for the analysis does not 
have at grade intersections which are those that most affect 
road safety. The Spanish high capacity network only has gra-
de-separated intersections. These types of intersections reduce 
the accident potential due to vertical separation of traffic. This 
result is in line with the findings of Ivan and O'Mara (1997). 
5. RO indicates that there is a differentiated behavior among toll 
highways, second generation autovías and first generation au-
tovías. 
Toll highways (TH) showed the expected negative sign in all mo-
dels suggesting that there are fewer fatalities, injuries and accidents 
in toll highways compared to AV, which is the reference class. In 
other words, toll highways managed and operated by the private 
sector turn out to be safer that free highways managed and operated 
by the public sector. 
The only odd result that was found in the analysis is that the va-
riable 1AV has an unexpected negative sign suggesting that 1AV 
has fewer fatalities, injuries and accidents compared to AV. This 
result is strange because, as mentioned earlier in this paper, first ge-
neration autovías (1AV) have poorer design standards than second 
generation autovías (AV). 
The main reason for that is that first generation autovías are among 
the busiest highways in Spain in terms of traffic so the AADT in 
these highways is often close to their capacity and consequently the 
speed of the flow is lower, which improves safety ratios. 
Variables 
Intercept 
Log (AADT) 
Log(%HGV) 
INC 
Road 
operation 
Log(vk) 
Measurement 
level 
S 
S 
c 
s 
c 
s 
Deviance (Dp) 
Pearson Chi-Square (X2) 
Log Likelihood 
BIC 
Overdispersion parameter (k) 
stretch with 
incentives 
n 
TH 
1AV 
Fatalities 
0.936 
(0.403) 
-0.700a 
(37.977) 
-0.084 
(0.236) 
-0.818 
(0.552) 
0.817 
(2.360) 
-0.461 
(2.954) 
-0.511b 
(6.545) 
^ | 
579.862 
1,669.727 
-486.091 
986.183 
1,021.121 
1.546 
Injuries 
0.334 
(0.269) 
-0.157a 
(10.016) 
-0.470a 
(37.863) 
-0.676c 
(2.670) 
0.125 
(0.629) 
-0.398a 
(11.809) 
-0.405a 
(23.900) 
2,562.148 
4,202.451 
-2,462.047 
4,938.093 
4,973.032 
3.891 
Accidents 
-0.677 
(0.947) 
-0.106b 
(4.031) 
-0.507a 
(37.781) 
-0.943b 
(3.946) 
0.167 
(0.880) 
-0.351a 
(7.562) 
-0.423a 
(22.610) 
^ | 
1,933.346 
2,784.678 
-1,978.212 
3,970.424 
4,005.362 
2.578 
Measure level: Scale (S), Categorical (Cj 
°p<0.01, "p<0.05, cp<0.10 
Table 3: Negative binomial regression models for fatalitites, injuries and accidents. 
The expressions of fatality, injury and accident rates for different 
road operations can be determined by the parameters estimated in 
Table 3. As one example, the equations of toll highways by segment 
(/') in specific scenarios are: 
Toll highways segments with incentives - without intersection: 
ATM. = 0.139(AADT)-0106(%HGV)-°-507 = 0.015 
Toll highways segments with incentives - at least 1 intersection: 
XTM. = 0.164(AADfyOW6(%HGVy0-507 = 0.018 
Toll highways segments without incentives -without intersec-
tion: 
ATM. = 0.357(AADf)-0W6(%HGV)-°-507 = 0.040 
Toll highways segments without incentives - at least 1 intersec-
tion: 
XTM. = 0A23(AADfyOW6(_%HGVy0-507 = 0.046 
From these expressions it can observe clearly that the incentives 
given to the concessionaires have a positive impact on reducing 
accident rates. For stretches without intersection, the number of 
accidents per 1 million vehicle-kilometers is about 2.66 times hig-
her in toll highways without incentives compared to toll highways 
with incentives. And, for stretches with at least 1 intersection, the 
number of accidents per 1 million vehicle-kilometers is about 2.55 
times higher in toll highways without incentives compared to toll 
highways with incentives 
7. Conclusions and future research 
The main conclusions of this paper are the following: 
• Some variables such as the AADT and the %HGV, which are 
not manageable by the contractor, are the most significant pre-
dictors of fatalities, injuries and accidents. 
• The INC variable was found to be statistically significant in 
the injury and accident model. However, if incentives have an 
impact on the frequency of road accidents, they have an im-
pact on fatalities as well, because of the negative sign in fatal 
models. If incentives given to the concessionaires avoid acci-
dents, they avoid fatalities which are a consequence of acci-
dents. The results indicate that incentives have an influence on 
road safety, there are more fatalities, injuries and accidents on 
road segments without incentives than in road segments with 
incentives. This fact demonstrates that the implementation of 
road safety incentives in PPP contracts is effective to encoura-
ge the contractor to adopt the measures that he can handles to 
improve road safety standards. 
• The results indicate the need for further research. First, the 
analysis of the size of the economic incentive set up in the 
PPP contract on the ultimate improvement of safety ratios is a 
crucial aspect. Second, it would be useful to analyze the evo-
lution of safety performance over the years in PPP highways 
with safety-based incentives. Third, a cross-cutting compari-
son of the different types of incentives (incentives related to 
the deadline of the project vs incentives related to payments) 
would be of the greatest interest. 
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